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Abstract
Daniel Kahneman. Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux) 499 pp. ISBN
978-0374275631.
In Thinking, Fast and Slow, Nobel Prize-winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman significantly sharpens our
understanding of human decision-making and the systems of thinking that underlie it. He offers a compelling
critique of the rational-agent model, arguing that, while we can and do use reason, we often fall back on a type
of thinking that operates quickly and requires less cognitive effort but is vulnerable to faulty belief.
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In his 2011 book, Thinking Fast and Slow, Nobel Prize-winning psychologist 
Daniel Kahneman significantly sharpens our understanding of human decision-
making and the systems of thinking that underlie it. He offers a compelling 
critique of the belief that we are, generally, rational decision makers, and, in its 
place, presents a much fuller theory that, while acknowledging our ability to think 
rationally, emphasizes our vulnerability to cognitive processes that lead to lazy 
thinking and faulty belief. 
The theory that Kahneman presents had its origin in research he undertook 
and published with Amos Tversky and others in the 1970s. Having first noticed 
that people’s decisions were prone to mistakes, the researchers sought to isolate 
and analyze the participants’ intuitive thinking and often-incorrect judgments. 
This research changed widely held assumptions about human nature, according to 
which behavior normally and usually proceeded from reason, except for those 
occasions on which reason was overcome by emotion. People used slow and 
deliberate thinking to evaluate possible solutions before making decisions, so said 
the near-consensus view. Tversky and Kahneman argued, however, that, while we 
can and do use reason, we often fall back on a type of thinking that is quick, 
requires less effort than rational thought, and is prone to error. Although these 
intuitive judgments were the focus of their research and its findings, they did not 
deny that rational thinking has a place, but, instead, argued that depending on 
intrinsic and extrinsic factors, both thought processes influenced decision-making. 
In Thinking Fast and Slow, Kahneman described these dual modes, or processes, 
as System 1 and System 2. 
System 2 will here be considered first, because it is the very model of 
reasoned deliberation Kahneman and colleagues challenged and then refined. It is 
the familiar model and, as it is the loftiest, it is the one with which most people 
self-identify. 
This kind of thinking attempts objectivity, and, in it, we take our time to 
weigh explicitly known evidence and consider alternatives before choosing a 
solution. When we use System 2, we are less likely to make mistakes. 
Unfortunately, it requires selective and sustained attention, which can be depleted 
by difficult cognitive reasoning as well as changes in motivation and self-control. 
Sometimes, people are too lazy to use System 2 thinking. It is at these moments, 
and when circumstances do not allow for deliberation, that we fall back on 
System 1. 
System 1 thinking is associated with intuition. It operates quickly and 
requires less cognitive effort, thus providing certain advantages. It is efficient in 
that it speeds up the decision-making process, often necessary, Kahneman argues, 
considering the many decisions we have to make every day in a world that 
bombards us with information. This type of intuitive thinking is governed by 
heuristics, or mental shortcuts, that we use to think and act quickly. Judgments 
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and decisions we make with heuristics can be good—or good enough—but 
heuristics can also lead to incorrect judgments. Kahneman cites examples of these 
heuristics. Among those he cites are the representativeness heuristic and the 
availability heuristic. 
The representativeness heuristic is used when making judgments about the 
probability of an event. It allows us automatically and easily, but sometimes 
erroneously, to identify causal connections between events. We prefer an ordered 
existence of causation and pattern to one of chance and random sequence, and, 
when such order is not present, we will intuitively impose it. With this distortion, 
subsequent mistakes are more likely. Kahneman illustrates his point using the 
example of the sex of six babies born in sequence at a hospital, which is, of 
course, random. The events are independent of each other, and the sex of one 
baby does not determine and cannot predict the sex of another. When asked to 
consider the possible birth gender sequences of BBBGGG, GGGGGG, and 
BGBBGB, we intuitively do not think that these three are equally likely. People 
tend to judge the last sequence as random because it “looks” random; however, 
probability theory is not concerned with what may appear random but with how 
events in a sequence are actually produced. 
As if errors resulting from this heuristic were not enough on their own, they 
can be magnified by the faith we place in small sample sizes: small samples 
contain greater variability than large samples, and, if we neglect to consider this 
fact, we inflate the significance of the information conveyed. An example 
Kahneman gives for this particular System 1 thought flaw is $1.7 billion 
ineffectively spent by the Gates Foundation to improve high-school student 
achievement and boost graduation rates by creating smaller schools, often 
splitting larger schools into smaller units. This initiative came as a result of the 
Foundation having observed the disproportionately large number of small schools 
ranked among the highest-achieving. What the Foundation neglected to consider 
was the equal overrepresentation of small schools among the lowest-achieving, as 
well.  This overrepresentation on both ends results from the greater variability in 
small samples. 
There may have been an evolutionary advantage to System 1’s quick pattern 
recognition/imposition and response. Quickly grouping stripes into a tiger without 
pausing for contemplation may indeed cause us to flee sooner and save our necks. 
But when misapplied, System 1 thinking can contribute to faulty judgments that 
can, as in the small schools example, prove very costly. 
Kahneman also explains what he and Tversky labeled the availability 
heuristic. This heuristic is the mental shortcut that arises from examples related to 
a particular problem or event coming immediately to mind. Although this 
example is not presented in the book, the availability heuristic can be seen in the 
belief one forms after reading a series of news stories about terrorist attacks, that 
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terrorist attacks are more common than they actually are. Yet, as a widely read 
article (Zenko 2012) demonstrated in recent years, Americans have the same odds 
of being killed by their own furniture as by terrorism (and, no, furniture deaths are 
not likely, either). The heuristic can also be seen at work in a related 
phenomenon: that of people who watch more than four hours of television a day 
believing, as they can easily bring to mind many particular examples of lawyers, 
physicians, and professional athletes, that more people are employed in these 
professions than is the case (Cantor 1994). 
Or consider an “availability cascade,” in which the media presents a story 
highlighting a risk that elicits concern from the public. Feelings of concern and 
fear shape how people will react to additional information and the decisions they 
will make, which itself is the affect heuristic, or a mental shortcut that relies on 
emotion to guide decision-making. Competing media outlets continue to cover not 
only the original story but also the emotional response to it, increasingly 
sensationalizing and exaggerating its significance. According to Kahneman, when 
experts or dispassionate voices then attempt to correct these distortions, they are 
either ignored or met with hostility. 
The availability heuristic also relates to judgments we make about ourselves. 
If asked to list six instances in which you were aggressive and to determine how 
aggressive you are, six instances probably come to mind fairly easily. Given the 
ease with which they came to mind, you would be more likely to describe 
yourself as aggressive. However, if asked to list twelve times you have behaved 
aggressively, the task becomes a little tougher. Because you cannot immediately 
recall twelve, you are less likely to describe yourself as aggressive, even if you 
recalled more than six. 
System 1 can also trip us up with a phenomenon known as the “peak-end 
rule.” This heuristic evaluates a past experience based chiefly upon our feelings at 
its most intense and at its end. This reconstruction, in which we make an entire 
experience align with its two most easily remembered moments, whether or not 
these moments were in fact typical, even helps determine our happiness—
regardless of its accuracy. In one case, patients who each underwent a 
colonoscopy that lasted for a short time but ended at a point of peak pain were 
compared to patients for whom the procedure lasted longer and had the same pain 
intensity but ended with no pain after having peaked relatively earlier. One might 
suspect, and rationally so, that a quick ending to a painful procedure is most 
appreciated by such patients, but the results Kahneman presents are surprising. 
Patients who endured the greater suffering of a longer procedure that ended 
without pain reported it as more pleasant than did those who underwent a shorter 
procedure that ended at the time of greatest pain. 
The many glitches of System 1 form some of the most interesting content in 
Thinking Fast and Slow; every bit as fascinating are the ways in which Systems 1 
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and 2 interact and work in tandem to minimize effort and optimize performance. 
System 1 generates impressions and feelings. If System 2 endorses them, these 
become beliefs, which in turn drive subsequent decisions and behavior. More 
often than not, System 2 simply accepts what System 1 sends it, and all runs 
smoothly enough. When, however, System 2 registers error or its potential, it 
asserts itself and summons more cognitive resources. System 2 can fail and, when 
it does, we fall back on System 1, all the while conning ourselves with a freshly 
created narrative that argues our reason is, in fact, in control. This rationalization 
is as quick as it is easy. 
Although not presented in the book, it is interesting to note here that this 
automatic tendency to create a story and even invent missing details to fill in the 
gaps in our memory has also been observed in split-brain patients (Gazzaniga 
1998). Split-brain procedure is used to treat severe epilepsy by cutting the corpus 
collosum, the bundle of fibers connecting the right and left hemispheres of the 
brain. One’s left hemisphere processes information presented to the right visual 
field, but it is also responsible for speech production; one can say what this 
hemisphere sees. Information presented to the left visual field, however, is 
processed by the right hemisphere, but because in the split-brain procedure the 
fibers connecting hemispheres have been cut, this sensory data cannot be 
transferred to the left hemisphere for speech. In an experiment with a split-brain 
patient, researchers presented a picture of a snow scene to the patient’s right 
hemisphere and a picture of a chicken foot to the left hemisphere. Four cards were 
placed in front of the patient, and he was asked to pick a card with his left hand 
and a card with his right hand related to what he saw. His left hand pointed to a 
shovel, and his right hand pointed to a chicken. When asked why he chose those 
items, his left hemisphere said that the chicken went with the chicken claw, and, 
without missing a beat, said that he picked the shovel because you need to clean 
out the chicken shed. The left hemisphere, having no plausible explanation, 
invented one. We create consistent and believable narratives that make sense of 
our experiences and memories. Gazzaniga’s examples confirms, with physiology, 
the very thing Kahneman argues in Thinking Fast and Slow, which is the strength 
and quickness of our readiness to creatively resolve dissonance and lacunae.  
Thinking Fast and Slow presents, in a highly accessible manner, a practical 
theory of human cognition and behavior, incorporating research that spans a 
generation. A fascinating text for both laymen and professionals, it has rightly 
earned much acclaim and leaves the reader with a solid foundation in intuition 
and reasoning. The importance of this book cannot be overstated, and it should be 
read by anyone who wishes to understand the dual processes underlying human 
decision-making and judgment. 
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